Energy Security is of increasing importance in today's world, yet little research has been carried out on the costs or benefits of energy security policies. This paper looks at the period after the 1970s to estimate the cost premium of electricity generation due to energy security policies.
Introduction
Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, energy security has been a concern for governments and policy makers. At the time, different countries responded to these concerns in different ways. It may therefore be the case that the cost of these responses gives an indication of the value policy makers have placed upon energy security, and so investigating this cost may yield important information. Energy security is currently high on the agenda of the European Union's energy policy, and so it is a pertinent time to examine the costs of previous energy security policies.
Recently, European gas insecurity has made headlines, but there are a number of additional issues that are less eye-catching but still worthy of research.
There exists a growing body of research into the costs of insecurity and the benefits from increased security of energy, but there is much less research available on the costs of providing the increased security.
These costs can take in a number of forms, such as increased fuel costs from sourcing secure supplies over insecure supplies, infrastructure costs arising from developing new and more secure systems and processes, 4 and the political costs of securing and protecting energy supplies. That is, energy policies that seek secure energy will result in a different energy mix than policies that have sought the cheapest energy. Comparing the two should give some indication of the cost of energy security policies. This paper therefore attempts to measure the costs of the energy security policies in four European countries from 1980-2000 by comparing the estimated lowest cost electricity generation scenario with the estimated costs of generation at the actual historical levels.
Policy Background
In order to assess the extent to which the difference between actual and predicted lowest cost is attributable to energy security measures, we first provide a brief outline of energy security policies in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. France made a clear shift in policy over the 1970s, with the revised policies being in force by the 1980s. Across all of Europe, energy policies have been affected first by the oil price shocks in 5 the 1970s and early 1980s, then by increasing pressure for deregulation through the 1980s and 1990s. It is important therefore to focus on the changes that governments and energy utility companies made in response to the energy insecurities of the 1970s, and to a lesser extent the early 1980s. This is not an in-depth analysis of institutional or economic factors, but rather a simplified overview to give some context to the rest of the paper.
French energy policy in the 1980s was very much a response to events of the 1970s. France had been very dependent on cheap oil imports from Algeria, but after Algerian independence, the favourable trading position was lessened; this happened shortly before the Yom Kippur War and OPEC-led oil shortages. French policy makers decided to pursue a less oil-dependent path, and with limited domestic gas and coal supplies becoming increasingly expensive, they looked to the opportunities available from nuclear power (Lucas, 1985; Matláry, 1997) .
There was already a significant atomic industry in France which enabled a relatively swift proliferation of atomic power stations in France, as well as developing the up-and down-stream industries necessary. Of course, 6 such changes were not the only French policy response to energy insecurities and it is not the case that the policy direction was chosen solely in respect to energy security concerns, but looking at this aspect allows for a measurable understanding of the costs of energy security policies.
In Germany, coal was a politically sensitive industry because of its employment potential, and so was supported by government subsidies and pro-coal policies for longer. Also, since it had large domestic supplies, coal was a viable source of secure energy. On the other hand, gas from the USSR was relatively cheap but had certain energy security risks. However, as Lucas (1985: 255) points out, whilst West Germany was reliant on Soviet gas supplies, the USSR was reliant on foreign exchange from West Germany. Nuclear was also seen as an increasing useful option after the oil price rises (Weyman-Jones, 1986) . Of course, German reunification is a key event and process in the midst of our period of analysis, which meant a number of discontinuities. For example, East German nuclear power plants did not meet West German safety standards, and so were shut down (Gröner, 1993) .
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Both Italy and Spain were affected by the oil price shocks, and responded in relatively similar ways. Due to their position on the Mediterranean Sea, they both pursued oil and gas pipelines with Northern African producers. However, this was a long process, and plans to increase the share of coal and nuclear, at least in Italy, were drawn up.
In the 1998 plan however, contributions from nuclear power were switched to plans for natural gas power plants due to public opposition to nuclear. In Spain, plans to develop nuclear power were also dropped after a moratorium on further construction (Matláry, 1997) .
Methodology
In order to assess the cost of the electricity generation policies of governments, we compare the actual economic costs of electricity generation with the costs of the policy they would have otherwise undertaken if they had no concerns for energy security. Therefore, we create an electricity generation counterfactual scenario based upon the 8 lowest cost, and measure the ES premium as the difference between the actual cost and the estimated lowest cost 1 .
The counterfactual ('lowest cost') model makes a set of assumptions which are outlined below:
1. All the extra cost is due to energy security issues. We recognise that a number of factors may have led to the least-cost option not being chosen, including uncertainty, politics, or contractual restrictions.
2. We use average data over the whole of the time period. This is due to data limitations. This assumption makes it possible to avoid highly complex modelling of demand and supply over the time period, including delays of data availability and construction delays. 3. The capacity available at the beginning of the period is maintained throughout, thereby negating the need for additional capacity, and therefore construction costs. This is a necessary simplification for the model. This assumption places extra emphasis upon the fuel and operating costs of power stations as there will be less construction modelled. However, in practice, it is not unusual to extend the life of power stations with refits or refurbishment. We take the 1980 generation levels to be the levels available without extra construction for the whole period.
4. There are no additional costs to stopping generation from one fuel.
This includes any social costs of a halt in electricity generation from one fuel, for example coal miner protests. Foreseeable decommissioning costs are included in the operating costs of plants.
5. There are no limitations to capacity in each country for each fuel, that is, if it was cheapest to do so, 100% of each country's electricity could be provided for by just one source.
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6. There are no requirements for diversity in energy supply. That is, there are no contractual or political requirements for a minimum or maximum level of electricity from one source.
7. Each country is a price taker in the fuel markets and that the prices would be the same regardless of the quantities used. However, it is noted that the prices do show a difference between countries even in internationally traded goods. The IEA's energy database provided data for the energy balances of the countries over the relevant period. The fuels used to generate electricity were coal, oil, gas, nuclear and renewables, which includes hydroelectricity, geothermal, combustible renewables and waste, and 'solar, wind and other'. The energy balances show the total energy from that source going to the four types of electricity generation plants -the figures are negative because the fuels are an input into that process.
15 Table 1 and Figure 2 show how the countries' average energy mixes over the period compare. It shows that each country had a large proportion of their generation from one particular source, in France it was nuclear, there was a very high proportion from coal in Germany and Spain, and petroleum (oil) in Italy. However, only France had a very dominant source, with the others having a more diverse portfolio. Spain's share of nuclear is almost as large as its coal. Oil data is from the "Liquid Fuels and Refinery Gas" data series, and Gas is from "Natural Gas and Gas Works Gas". The next data needed was the costs of the electricity generation processes. The costs of electricity generation fall into three main categories: construction and investment costs, operation and maintenance costs, and fuel costs. Nuclear energy also incurs decommissioning costs, and these are included in the construction costs (see Carle and Moynet, 1993) . 
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Data availability for the total costs of each generation method for each country over the time period is extremely limited in the public domain, and due to the politicized nature of the generation industry, some industry based sources for costs may be less than ideally transparent. Where possible, we used representative cost breakdowns available in the literature to find the proportion of the total cost of generation that arises from fuel, operating costs and construction costs.
We then used the fuel prices to estimate the operating costs, construction costs and total costs. This is because the most detailed data by country was for the fuel component, so each country's cost differences could be estimated best using this method.
The fuel costs for coal, oil and gas have been obtained from the IEA's database, which contains quantities and prices for fuel inputs to electricity generation and for industry. The prices used were for steam coal, high sulphur fuel oil, and natural gas. Where possible we used the prices for electricity generation, but for French coal and gas we used the prices to industry as the prices to electricity generation were unavailable.
A comparison between the industry and generation prices for other 19 countries showed that this is a reasonable substitution to make. The operation and construction costs for coal and gas were estimated from these fuel costs using cost breakdowns from Küffer (1993) for Swiss electricity generation in the early 1990s. This data was chosen as it was the most complete dataset. Cost breakdowns for oil-fired generators for the period were harder to obtain, but Yoda et al (1993) provide detail for Japanese generators from 1982-1992. They also provide cost breakdowns for the other fuels which are comparable to the other sources.
Fuel costs for nuclear and renewables are more complex. Uranium costs are usually withheld as confidential for security reasons, and only represent a small part of the total fuel costs to generation since processing costs have to be considered. These are often linked to longterm agreements with preferential rates and are rarely made public. For renewables, the fuel costs are effectively zero (or there may be transport and processing costs for waste generation). The costs for nuclear and renewables are therefore more linked in with construction, maintenance and decommissioning costs. These vary widely between the technology 20 used and often contain site-specific costs. Construction and investment costs are also paid over a long time-span, and so the accounting/discounting method used can affect the cost considerably.
The following paragraphs outline our estimations for nuclear and renewable costs.
The primary source for nuclear power in France is Carle and Moynet (1993) . They present costs for the construction and running of nuclear, coal and gas power stations and the date of publication suggests that these would be representative figures for the central period we are modelling. As a comparison, their costs for coal and gas generation correspond with those derived from the IEA statistics above. Since there was greater investment in the French nuclear industry (including the upstream industries) in the 1970s, we assume that the French nuclear costs are lower than the other countries. The cost includes dismantling, fuel waste treatment and R&D costs.
To estimate the price of nuclear power for Germany, Italy and Spain figures from Küffer (1993) were used. This source presents Swiss data, 21 but it is reasonable to assume that given the investments mentioned above, the Swiss costs are similar to the costs in these countries. This includes the "back-end of the fuel cycle, decommissioning and final storage" of the nuclear waste (p.269).
Estimating a unit price for renewables is perhaps the most problematic, since they are highly dependent on construction costs, which are likely to be highly site-specific. Table 2 shows the quantity of electricity generated in the relevant countries by the different renewable source. It shows that hydroelectricity is the dominant type of renewable electricity for all countries, and that combustible renewables account for about a quarter of Germany's renewable electricity generation, and the other sources provide much less. In the light of this, it seems reasonable to suggest that a figure for the costs of hydroelectric power could be a suitable benchmark cost for the model. However, due to the high site-specific nature of hydroelectric generation, such costs are not easily available. Table 3 shows that the estimated variable costs of hydroelectric power (estimated for the South West region of the UK) vary from €35,000 to €210,000 per GWh, which when compared to the other costs in Table 3 , it can be one of the cheapest or the most expensive of technologies. As a comparison, Küffer (1993) estimates Swiss hydroelectricity generation costs to be from €81,000-120,000 for run of river plants and €130,000-€200,000 per GWh 23 for high-pressure hydro plants with reservoirs (prices in 2000 €). The variation in costs here arises from the capital costs. Although it is not made explicit in the text, the table suggests that the variation in capital costs is due to variations in capacity, rather than for example, technology or siting decisions. *Cost based on a specific example, although in practice a variation on these costs will occur. Table 4 shows the costs used in the construction of the model. Due to the limitations of the data, the cost for renewable electricity is the same in each country, and the cost for nuclear is the same for Germany, Italy and Spain. However, because the cost of coal, oil and gas-fired electricity varies, it still allows the model to have different outcomes for each country. It shows that costs in Germany are generally higher than the other countries, due in part to higher fuel costs, and in part to less efficient generation (as calculated by our model). This lack of efficiency may in part be due to problems caused by reunification, as two different generation policies merged to become one.
Results Table 5 shows the results of the model run. It shows the actual case versus the lowest cost case costs in total and per Gigawatt hour. The overall cost estimated is the difference between the two cases. Although it has the lowest costs for electricity, France has the lowest overall 
Discussion and Further Research
The model shows that there is a difference between the estimated lowest cost and estimated actual costs of generation for all the countries. The estimated cost premium was lowest for
France in both absolute and relative terms and highest for Italy.
Inasmuch as this model can yield firm conclusions, it suggests that policies such as France's, where a secure fuel is set as the cornerstone of electricity generation, are lower cost than policies such as Italy's, in which attempts were made to make existing fuels such as oil and gas more secure.
However, the results from this model are sensitive to the data used for costs. This is limited in three main ways.
1. The methodology for investment and operating costs is very simple, and is based on energy generation costs presented in the literature. A more transparent methodology, which would tie in better with the CASES project would be to use the overnight investment cost methodology with the Average Annualised Generation Cost model, but this requires annual cost data which is unavailable.
2. Where cost data was unavailable, data from similar countries has been transferred. Ideally, more accurate data for each country would be used.
3. The costs and quantities used for the modelling were based on the 1980-2000 average. This leads to a static model which cannot account for changes in the price/costs of generation over the time.
A dynamic model, which allowed for changes in price over time, would be more realistic. This would require construction and operating cost data for the whole time period. It would also allow for the modelling of obsolescence/planned closure of plants over the time which would place a greater emphasis on the construction costs and ensure that the model would be less reliant upon the capacity available in 1980.
However, despite these limitations, these results provide a valuable first indication of the importance of energy security in determining energy supply costs. Energy security is still an important policy concept this model suggests that different energy security policies do have costs that impact on the price of electricity. With greater information about historical costs, these impacts could be understood more fully, enabling a more informed analysis of current energy security decisions.
